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Abstract. Very little work has been undertaken on the consequences of economic recession on Corporate Real Estate 
(CRE) and its realignment following strategy changes. Only those CRE portfolios with short term leases have a dynamic 
alignment capability allowing them to readily adjust to change. For those with longer leases this leads to the creation of 
a surplus property provision (SPP). This paper analyses the relationship between SPP and metrics for business and CRE 
through a period of significant change, by examining company annual reports using a distributed time lag auto-regression 
model. The results show an inverse relationship between SPP and profits but a positive relationship with both turnover and 
employment, suggesting that declining profits trigger the re-shaping of CRE. SPP is used to provide portfolio flexibility 
because of the lack of dynamic alignment capability. SPP increases as the commitment to short leases (<5 years) increases. 
The estimated time for SPP to revert to zero ranges from 3 to 9 years, but one category, financial services, is continuing to 
increase its liability. CRE agility has yet to be visible in the financial reports of companies, suggesting its impact remains 
limited, indicating the relationship between business parameters and CRE is more complicated than envisaged.
Keywords: corporate real estate, CRE dynamic alignment, surplus property provisions, agility, restructuring.
Introduction
Internal and external factors operate to influence and 
change an organisation and latterly have impacted the rate 
of change. Change arises directly from strategic choice, 
such as business strategy, and from transformation in the 
external environment, such as economic recession. Indi-
rectly it can be through the likes of generational differenc-
es, but change is itself an influencer of business strategy, 
especially the speed of change. The two dominant busi-
ness strategy theoretical frameworks since the mid 1980’s 
have been sustained competitive advantage (Porter, 1985) 
and the Resource-Based View (RBV) (Barney, 1991). Nei-
ther consider CRE, despite its importance to the business 
(O’Mara, 1999). Both assume change to be a gradual tran-
sition, therefore, CRE re-alignment with a new business 
strategy would evolve. However, increasingly these strate-
gies have been challenged by more dynamic approaches. 
Transient competitive advantage (McGrath, 2013) assumes 
a short-lived competitive advantage in which business 
must continually change to find the next short-term gain. 
Whilst blue ocean strategy (Kim & Maugborgne, 2015) is 
more radical, stating that true competitive advantage can 
only be found in areas of new business or by applying 
new operating methods to existing business areas. Both 
of these new strategic models require the organisation to 
be agile and unencumbered by assets and liabilities from 
previous strategies, including ideas, people and CRE. 
When change occurs realignment of all resources needs 
to happen quickly.
Existing CRE alignment models focus on the dated 
business strategy models of sustained competitive advan-
tage and RBV. For example, Nourse and Roulac (1993) and 
O’Mara (1999) are based on sustained competitive advan-
tage, whilst Gibler and Lindholm (2012) adopted the RBV 
model. The newer, more dynamic strategies of transient 
competitive advantage and blue ocean strategy have not 
found their way into CRE alignment models. Changes to 
buildings, the way space is used, the impact of ubiquitous 
technology, generational differences and the requirement 
for CRE itself (Joroff & Becker, 2017) all require CRE to 
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be agile and dynamic re-alignment a continual process. 
Alignment researchers “tend to advance their own model 
in isolation” (Heywood & Arkesteijn, 2018, p. 17), which 
has created a disconnect leading to a “disordered CRE 
alignment theory” (Heywood & Arkesteijn, 2017, p. 144).
The current alignment models are theories (Heywood 
& Arkesteijn, 2018) that seek to provide a “better under-
standing of the complementary structure among corpo-
rate real estate strategies on the theoretical level” (Gibler & 
Lindholm, 2012, p. 26). These models focus on how CRE 
strategies impact on the performance of the business, but 
are not always validated (Heywood & Arkesteijn, 2018) 
nor do they extend to the implementation of CRE re-
alignment (e.g. Gibler & Lindholm, 2012, Figure 2, p. 36). 
Heywood and Arkesteijn (2018) identified a number of 
models that include implementing real estate strategy as 
a factor. However, none of these models examine the ac-
tual implementation of the strategy, rather they identify 
possible changes to CRE practices or strategic real estate 
options. Consequently, current alignment models exclude 
the practicalities of their own implementation, in particu-
lar the effects that arise from the creation of surplus space 
by closing operational units. Improvement of CRE align-
ment theory and how it can operate in the ‘real world’ 
is important, especially in bridging the gap between aca-
demic theory and practitioners and providing a cohesive 
approach to the subject (Heywood & Arkesteijn, 2017).
The three elements of CRE strategy implementation 
are the acquisition of new space, its asset management 
and the disposal of unwanted units (Kämpf-Dern & Pfnür, 
2014). A capability for dynamic alignment should enable a 
CRE portfolio to rapidly re-align to the new business strat-
egy. That should avoid the creation of a surplus property 
portfolio arising from unwanted space, although it may 
be impaired by a shortage of suitable new space. There 
are a number of complexities in acquiring new premises 
and in the asset management of CRE (Apgar, 2009), but 
arguably there are greater challenges with the disposal of 
unwanted space. Surplus property, in particular leasehold 
space, continues to be a financial drain on a business until 
lease expiry or the unit is disposed of. As surplus space 
does not directly impact business operations it has both a 
low visibility and a low priority within the business. Con-
sequently, CRE managers might only be allocated limited 
resources to mitigate the problems of surplus property.
Each business is unique in its CRE requirements, in-
cluding what it regards as core and peripheral (Gibson & 
Lizieri, 1999) and in how it structures ownership − the 
freehold-leasehold split (Haynes & Nunnington, 2010). In 
practical terms the disposal of unwanted freehold prop-
erty generally offers more potential solutions and fewer 
restrictions than that of a comparable surplus leasehold. 
Both have to deal with the effects of market demand to-
gether with internal financial constraints and issues, such 
as writing off the costs of fit-outs. The disposal of surplus 
leases has the added complexity of the involvement of the 
landlord and their consent to subletting etc. which has an 
effect on the cost and risk profiles. Whilst the lease pro-
vides the framework for disposal decision-making it does 
not provide certainty. The reality is that the landlord is 
the ultimate decision maker, despite the interests of the 
two parties not being aligned; often even polar opposites. 
In practice a landlord will most likely primarily focus on 
asset value with cashflow probably a secondary considera-
tion, whereas for the occupier cashflow is likely to be the 
primary consideration, followed by any write-off of capital 
investment. Consequentially, a tenant’s proposal to solve a 
surplus leasehold problem will have to be acceptable to the 
landlord. Principally this will need to improve the asset 
value, whilst compensating for any cashflow differential 
over the current lease term. Even with such a holistic so-
lution there is no obligation on the landlord to act col-
laboratively or in a logical manner. The landlord has the 
potential to delay or prevent transactions, whilst actions 
to force a landlord are generally commercially unviable. 
There is a lack of research into the behaviour of both land-
lords and tenants in the operation of lease clauses, despite 
the impact it has on the operation of leases. The limited 
literature is focussed on specific issues, such as break 
clauses (e.g. Cooke & Woodhead, 2008).
Surplus leaseholds have been an issue for a number of 
years in the UK reflecting the traditional long lease struc-
ture (Cooke, 2004). The limited research on the subject in-
dicates an increasing rather than decreasing problem for 
FTSE350 companies (the largest 350 companies by market 
capitalisation listed on the London Stock Exchange) with 
the surplus property provision (SPP) rising from £1.6bn in 
2007 to £4bn in 2014 (Cooke & Appel-Meulenbroek, 2015). 
The paucity of research reflects wider issues around CRE re-
search, which includes; a relatively limited number of CRE 
researchers (Heywood, 2011), the omission of a cross disci-
plinary approach in CRE (Lizieri, 2003), a lack of corporate 
strategy researchers considering CRE issues and seemingly 
no CRE researchers looking at business (Roulac, 2001). The 
limited and generally dated research on surplus property 
has focussed on disposal of freeholds (e.g. Gale & Case, 
1989), considered specific categories (e.g. Avis & Dent, 2004 
on the NHS), assessed the scale of the issue (e.g. Cooke & 
Appel-Meulenbroek, 2015), considered the practical issues 
of the problem (e.g. Cooke & Foster, 2016) or examined ac-
counting regulation change (e.g. Maiona, 2013). The limited 
research reflects the lack of attention the subject receives 
academically and professionally, despite it being a key fac-
tor in the success of business change and CRE realignment. 
Intrinsic to that success of CRE realignment is the removal 
of ‘unwanted properties’ together with their drain on cash 
and management resources.
This paper poses hypotheses which are tested with the 
aim of understanding the relationship between business 
and CRE parameters and the surplus leasehold portfo-
lio, including whether individual categories of business 
(e.g. retail, financial services, etc.) behave differently. It 
examines empirical data drawn from financial reports of 
companies, including business data (turnover, profitability 
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and employment numbers) and CRE data (lease profile 
and the SPP made for surplus leasehold property) over 
an eight-year period. The primary analysis is based on a 
distributed time lag auto-regression model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
The following section discusses the literature with respect 
to the question how CRE operational requirements can al-
ter as business changes and the creation of a surplus port-
folio when CRE requirements change. Next, the research 
questions are formulated and the adopted methodology 
described. Then, in the following section the results and 
discussion are presented. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of limitations, issues for practitioners and sugges-
tions for further research.
1. Corporate real estate management and surplus 
property provision
Neither of the two business strategy models used by CRE 
researchers expressly state that CRE is a resource of an 
organisation. Although resources are regarded as assets 
they are rarely seen as a source of competitiveness. The 
most common real estate strategy, especially for larger 
firms, remains that of cost reduction, which Gibler and 
Lindholm (2012) identified as the number one priority for 
31% of CRE Managers, with productivity and flexibility 
someway behind at 10% each. When assets are bundled 
or linked within the organisation, they can drive superior 
performance (MacIntosh & MacLean, 2015) but they can 
also create rigidity (Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2011) 
and impair dynamic capability to react and adjust to a 
new business strategy. CRE is a resource which can create 
rigidity and impair the organisation if dynamic alignment 
capability is not built in. The change from a static to an 
agile portfolio was identified by Joroff and Becker (2017) 
as one of the primary shifts in CRE over the last two dec-
ades. Indeed, they identified it as a paramount objective. 
The ability to adjust CRE to provide this agility requires a 
dynamic alignment capability. The link between business 
and CRE decision-making is important because “effective 
real estate decisions are integral to the realisation of over-
all business objectives” (Nourse & Roulac, 1993, p. 476).
The development of a business strategy is not a defined 
process, rather it is an iterative, emergent and adaptive one 
(e.g. Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2009; Kay, 2010). If 
this iterative process, with feedback loops, has been adopt-
ed both the organisation and all of its managers should 
have learnt about the risks that CRE rigidity poses and, 
consequently, have amended their business decision-mak-
ing process. Business should have built flexibility into its 
CRE through dynamic alignment capability, enabling it to 
exploit opportunities and avoid creating surplus property. 
A holistic view of strategy decision-making is required as 
moving away from a snapshot approach will remove the 
risk of overlooking “important seismic shifts in business” 
(Krumm & de Vries, 2003, p. 66). It will allow the likes 
of the longevity of CRE lease decisions to be taken into 
consideration.
A common method of categorisation of CRE is by cost 
and increasingly internal performance measures (Rira-
tanaphong & Van der Voordt, 2015). However, occupi-
ers also need to classify it from defensive and offensive 
perspectives. Defensively the business needs to know in 
advance which units it will close if there is a downturn re-
quiring a reduction in CRE. Whilst CRE flexibility allows 
the smooth integration of new business acquisitions or 
changing to more suitable premises. The decision-making 
process needs to be structured with these points in mind 
and implemented for each CRE decision thereby building 
dynamic alignment in to the portfolio.
Gibson and Lizieri (1999) proposed a framework for 
CRE to reflect the changes to new employment structures 
and working practices. They identified the core and periph-
ery elements of CRE. The core portfolio is characterised by 
properties that the business needs to control all aspects 
of, including an ability to change, which will comprise 
the likes of the HQ and manufacturing plant, and will be 
owned or held on long leases. Periphery properties make 
up the remainder of the portfolio and comprise two pe-
riphery elements. Those required for one to five years will 
be held on short leases (<5 years), whilst project space will 
be on very flexible pay as you go arrangements (e.g. ser-
viced offices). Such an approach provides the CRE Man-
ager with a blueprint for implementing change to the CRE.
An often-cited approach to assessing the worth of 
CRE is its added value which is identified as a decision-
making driver in a number of CRE alignment papers 
(e.g. Lindholm, Gibler, & Levainen, 2006). The defini-
tion of added value is used loosely and does not appear 
to be grounded in the economic concept of economic 
value added (EVA) (Worthington & West, 2001), a more 
exact and complex definition. Yet for CRE a significant 
consideration is understanding all of the ramifications 
of the effects a change to CRE strategy has, as the im-
pact will not be as simple as an increase in the market 
value of a property. Jensen, van der Voordt, and Coenen 
(2012) identified the need for a more holistic solution 
and a number of models have been reviewed by Hey-
wood and Arkesteijn (2017) who identified various short 
comings. Van der Voordt, Jensen, Hoendervanger, and 
Bergsma (2016) created the Value Adding Management 
model which assumes a continuous cyclical process of 
Planning, Doing, Checking and Acting. This is illustrated 
as a closed loop system which provides internal feed-
back, but does not explicitly show where external factors, 
such as the business environment and the business itself, 
can influence the models’ parameters. Whilst they may 
be dealt with by evaluating circumstances a schematic 
that shows a closed loop system conveys a sense that 
CRE operates in isolation from the business itself. There 
has not been the recognition that business is a complex 
adaptive system (Reeves, Levin, & Ueda, 2016), and CRE 
is part of that broader ecosystem. Another limitation of 
CRE alignment models is that they are office-centric and 
omit other property types, to the detriment of the overall 
debate and engagement with practitioners.
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To identify any added value there is a need to meas-
ure CRE performance and the effects of change over time. 
However, CRE performance measurement predominantly 
comprises input indicators (e.g. operating costs) with 
insufficient attention paid to those measures that affect 
strategic decision-making (de Vries, de Jonge, & van der 
Voordt, 2008). CRE added value is not viewed as a multi-
dimensional concept. In particular, the impact of ‘time’ is 
overlooked and the disconnect between the relevant peri-
ods such as business strategy cycle (<2 years), the life span 
of the leases (circa 10 years) and CRE investment write 
down periods (>20 years). The theory-based approach of 
CRE alignment to business strategy generally discounts 
time as a factor. It does so by the simple expediency of 
ignoring it and assuming it is a one-off event rather than 
a continual dynamic process. In the same way relocation 
strategy is not considered in the context of what happens 
to the existing property. The added value approach too 
frequently defaults to the lean management ideology of 
reducing costs as that is readily understood by both prop-
erty and non-property managers.
Various techniques have been proposed to assess 
alignment models, for example, the Balanced Scorecard 
(BSC) (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). The financial perspective 
in the BSC matrix should include SPP arising from a strat-
egy change. Underpinning the BSC technique is long-term 
strategic learning and feedback from the BSC outputs to 
improve business performance and the BSC itself. To be 
effective, performance measurement needs to measure the 
right things and for the output to be relevant in the con-
text of a decision-making process (Neely & Bourne, 2000). 
This necessitates a holistic approach to strategy develop-
ment, decision-making and implementation, including 
consideration of the entire life cycle to understand the in-
ter-relationship between business and CRE strategy devel-
opment, decision-making, lease lengths and SPP. It needs 
to include how the risks and costs of surplus property are 
mitigated, including their impact on the performance of 
the business, together with an assessment of the perfor-
mance of the CRE team in alleviating the SPP impact. The 
iterative feedback loops within strategy development and 
decision-making should review decisions and assess the 
ultimate consequences to correct the criteria for the fu-
ture, namely take an emergent strategy approach (Mintz-
berg et al., 2009). This needs to form the basic framework 
of CRE alignment decision-making.
There appears to be an underlying assumption in 
alignment models that the added value approach is one-
sided. Either value is added, or the effect is neutral, with 
zero influence. This is despite wider discussions on added 
value itself and omits the idea that a wrong decision on 
CRE can remove value, namely there can be a negative 
effect. For example, mis-specifying a production facility 
can impact production capacity. Creating surplus space 
can reduce value. If the property is owned writing off fit 
out costs and writing down asset value negatively impacts 
business value. In addition, for surplus leasehold property 
it will necessitate the making of a provision. An example 
is when the USA IT company Cisco, in anticipation of 
business expansion, took a number of leases in the Dot-
com boom (1997 to 2001) on office units at Green Park 
near Reading, UK. The planned expansion did not take 
place and the company only occupied about 25% of the 
leased space. The remaining office building of approxi-
mately 550,000 sq.ft. remained vacant for over a decade 
until leases were surrendered close to expiry following a 
change in ownership of the office park (CoStar, 2012).
Under International Accounting Standard 37 (IAS37, 
2001) surplus leases with more than 12 months to expiry 
require that an SPP is made. A capital sum is required 
to cover the cost of the liability resulting from what has 
become a non-operational onerous lease, through to the 
first exit date (Cooke, 2004). The provision for surplus 
property is taken in the year of closure and reviewed an-
nually, reducing profits in the year it is first made and in 
subsequent years when re-provisioning is undertaken. An 
annual review is required under IAS37 to ensure that the 
cash drain arising from payment of rents, etc. is topped 
up as necessary, ensuring the provision remains adequate 
to cover the liabilities. When an operational leasehold is 
closed a number of events take place. Firstly, the rent li-
ability is removed from the operating lease profile, with 
a reduction in the lease total disclosed. Secondly, any re-
maining book value will be written down to zero. Finally, 
a provision is made for the liability of the lease (the SPP), 
assuming it has more than 12 months to an exit date. The 
SPP is calculated in several stages, firstly the gross liability 
is calculated based on costs to exit (including rent, service 
charge, property taxes, dilapidations etc.). Then an assess-
ment of cost mitigation is undertaken based on disposal 
assumptions (including rents receivable, marketing and 
other disposal costs). This element is deducted from the 
gross liability to create the net liability, the SPP.
The SPP is a specific charge that will reduce the profit 
for the year it is made (or re-assessed). Thus, perversely 
at the point when the business is under financial pres-
sure a reduction in profits is required because of the de-
duction for the provision. There is the potential to see a 
lag between the decline in revenue and/or profits and the 
timing of the SPP. This reflects the process of assessing is-
sues and determining a revised strategy with CRE change 
implemented subsequently. Once business recovery is 
underway any surplus property should be brought back 
into use before new space is acquired. There should not 
be an increase in lease liability without the SPP having 
been removed.
2. Research questions
If a business has learnt from previous experience it will 
have both a flexible organisation and a CRE portfolio 
capable of dynamic alignment. CRE will be structured to 
facilitate the rapid implementation of any change, any sig-
nificant downturn in business and/or change to business 
strategy will see the organisation shed its shortest lease 
commitments first. This will begin with the second pe-
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zero is a measure of CRE dynamic alignment capability 
(Q3).
The fourth research question (Q4) considers the inter-
relationship between SPP and the lease profile. If business 
performance declines, there will be a reduction in shorter-
term leases (<5 years) as an SPP is made. This indicates 
a structured portfolio with dynamic alignment, whereas 
a decline in longer leases (>5 years) indicates a lack of 
CRE dynamic alignment. We hypothesise that a negative 
relationship between SPP and short-term leases but no re-
lationship between SPP and long-term leases indicates the 
existence of dynamic alignment of CRE (Q4).
3. Methodology
This research examines the annual reports for UK com-
panies quoted in the FTSE350 Index for the period 2007 
to 2014 inclusive: the period of the financial crisis and 
recession. After an initial analysis certain companies were 
excluded because they were atypical in their use of CRE, 
including property companies (who own to lease), invest-
ment funds (generally virtual organisations from a CRE 
perspective), natural resource companies (who own land 
for extraction purposes), health, transport and utility 
companies (CRE is generally owned) and those who did 
not have accounts for the entire period. The first stage of 
analysis splits the dataset between companies that made 
an SPP in the period and those that did not. As a con-
sequence, the sample size for both the construction and 
leisure categories became too small (<10 companies) and 
were excluded from the analysis. This provided a final 
dataset of 170 companies split in 99 SPP companies (those 
companies that make a surplus property provision) and 71 
non-SPP companies (those that do not make a provision 
at all in the eight year period).
The analysis consolidated the companies into broad 
business categories, each with a mixture of property types:
 – Finance – include offices and retail, the bank branch 
network;
 – Professional Services  – include offices and storage 
facilities;
 – Technology, Media and Telecommunications 
(TMT) – comprises offices plus more technical space 
such as telephone exchanges and data centres;
 – Manufacturing  – whilst predominantly industrial 
units will include offices;
 – Retail – will primarily be shops but includes offices 
and the warehouse distribution network.
For all 170 companies a profile was created for busi-
ness and lease metrics by rebasing the data to 100 in 2007 
to illustrate the general trends for the metrics over the 
eight year period. The second stage was to provide a broad 
context for the different categories split between SPP com-
panies (those that make a surplus property provision) and 
non-SPP (those that do not make a provision). This was 
carried out by using an independent samples t-test of dif-
ferences in means in 2014 of the business and CRE metrics 
between the SPP and non-SPP groups. A further t-test was 
riphery group (pay-as-you-go space), followed by first pe-
riphery (short-term leases initially <1 year then 2−5 years) 
before longer leases in the core portfolio are considered 
for closure. The greater the dynamic alignment capability 
the greater the proportion of leased space in the periphery 
group. A flexible organisation will be able to re-align its 
CRE to a new business model without the need to create 
an SPP. Only if change is extensive will leases with an un-
expired term closer to five years be affected and with that 
a need to create an SPP, but because leases are short it will 
be a temporary phenomenon.
A change to business strategy frequently results from 
significant internal or external change, such as a reces-
sion or disruptive technological innovation; the period 
2007−2014 included both. Businesses came under pres-
sure from reduced revenue and/or profitability and from 
new entrants introducing new products and services (of-
ten technology driven) but unencumbered by existing 
CRE. Data on business metrics and CRE was extracted 
from the annual financial reports of companies in the 
FSE350 for that period to test hypothesised relationships 
in four research questions.
The first research question (Q1) considers whether 
business and CRE metric profiles differ between those 
companies that make an SPP and those that do not. We 
hypothesise that companies that are agile are less likely to 
create an SPP because they will be able to adjust their CRE 
to the changing environment (Q1). Larger companies are 
likely to be less agile and therefore slower to change direc-
tion and hence more likely to make an SPP.
The second research question (Q2) considers what trig-
gers the making of an SPP. Our hypothesis is that a decline 
in turnover and/or profits and/or profit margin and/or full-
time employee numbers (FTE’s) indicates a deterioration 
in the business. This will trigger a cost reduction exercise 
commensurate with the severity of the decline, which will 
result in a contraction in production and/or FTE’s and/or 
fixed overheads (including CRE). Consequently, the rela-
tionship between SPP and the metrics of turnover, profit, 
profit margin and FTE numbers are expected to be inverse; 
SPP will increase as they decline (Q2).
The third research question (Q3) considers the rela-
tionship between the longevity of the SPP and CRE dy-
namic alignment. SPP will decline as leases expire, breaks 
are exercised or surrendered, although in practice, land-
lords generally only accept a surrender close to a break 
or expiry date. A decline in SPP might indicate busi-
ness recovery and re-occupation of surplus space, but in 
practice businesses have exhibited a reluctance to do so. 
Operational teams regard such space as ‘tainted’. The SPP 
total increases when new surplus properties are added 
and when re-provisioning for existing surplus properties 
is required. Initial cuts to CRE should be to pay as you 
go space followed by short-term leases. If CRE has an in-
herent dynamic alignment capability it will be structured 
around a core and periphery model (Gibson & Lizieri, 
1999), therefore the SPP will only exist for a short time 
(2−3 years). Consequently, the speed that SPP reverts to 
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carried out on the percentage change between 2007 and 
2014 for variables. This analysis allowed us to examine the 
business and CRE metrics over the period and consider 
differences between the SPP and non-SPP groups (Q1). 
The sample sizes for the non-SPP categories of Retail, 
TMT and Professional Services are relatively small, which 
raises the question as to the reliability of the outcomes 
of the t-test. However, this does not necessarily invalidate 
the test because a sample of 8 companies is not regarded 
as very small (N < 5) (de Winter, 2013). Although the test 
works for small samples there is a question as to the extent 
to which a small sample like this is representative for the 
companies in the sector. This is a consideration to be kept 
in mind. The only very small category was Retail non-SPP 
(4 companies) and the t-test does not indicate any signifi-
cant relationship between the two groups for this category.
The non-SPP can be categorised into three sub-sec-
tions: (i) companies that do not have surplus leases; (ii) 
those with surplus leases but deemed it insignificant to 
require an SPP; and (iii) those with surplus leases in their 
total provision, but do not identify SPP separately from 
their overall provision. As there is not the information 
available to determine the exact status an assumption has 
been made that if a company does not state an SPP figure 
it is because they do not have any surplus leasehold prop-
erty. The 71 non-SPP companies have been excluded from 
the subsequent regression analysis as the SPP is zero for 
that group for all years.
The primary analysis technique used on the SPP com-
panies was a distributed time lagged auto-regression mod-
el. The model includes SPP as the dependent variable and 
the previous year’s SPP value as the auto-regression term 
to take the time-series nature of the data into account. 
The independent variables are turnover, profit, profit mar-
gin, FTE’s, net assets, owned CRE and operating leases 
(grouped into leases <1 year, leases 2−5 years and leases 
>5 years). The profit figure adopted was the stated profit 
less any increase in the SPP for that year. Any increase 
in SPP will decrease the profit for that year, therefore, to 
identify the underlying profits for the business the effect 
of that deduction needs to be removed by adding back in 
the increase in the SPP. Profit margin is calculated using 
the adjusted profit expressed as a percentage of turnover. 
In addition, the Total CRE was calculated (lease total plus 
the owned CRE) allowing us to assess the proportion of 
the Total CRE that leases comprise.
Regression models were estimated for each category and 
for the whole portfolio, All Companies, with 2007 as the 
base year. A high degree of multicollinearity was expected 
between the metrics which could give rise to estimation 
problems. To identify the most significant variable amongst 
those variables that are strongly correlated (a correlation 
≥0.700), we undertook regression analysis with the metrics 
individually whilst retaining the auto-regression term and 
the dummy variables. The variable that provided the highest 
goodness of fit (R2 Adjusted) was identified as the most sig-
nificant variable and selected for the final model. When the 
regression was run, a further check for the effects of multi-
collinearity was undertaken by examining both the Vari-
ance Inflation Factor and tolerance level measures. Dummy 
variables for encoding the year are included as independent 
variables, one per year, to capture any fixed effects that are 
year specific as the regression constant and auto-regressions 
pick up general trends.
For Q2 and Q3 the independent variables were turno-
ver, profit, profit margin and FTE’s for each category. The 
estimated coefficients of the independent variables offer 
information about the triggers of SPP (Q2). The estimated 
coefficient of the previous year’s SPP (the auto-regression 
term) offers information on the speed of decline/increase 
in the SPP (Q3). If the coefficient equals 1.0 the SPP is 
static, below 1.0 indicates a decline, with <0.5 a rapid de-
cline, whereas >1.0 indicates that the SPP is increasing. 
Finally, regressions were run for Q4 with the independ-
ent variables consisting of the value of short-term leases 
(<1 year), medium-term leases (2−5 years) and long-term 
leases (>5 years).
Implementing change to CRE is generally slow but 
changing a property from operational to non-operational 
can be virtually instantaneous. An annual report of a com-
pany reflects the position at a moment in time, the end of 
the financial year. However, the actual change to business 
strategy and CRE can occur at any time during the twelve-
months of the financial year. To factor in an allowance for 
implementation a one-year lag has been assumed to be a 
possibility for each independent variable.
Checks were undertaken to verify that the residuals for 
each regression were normally distributed by examining 
the histogram of the residuals. For brevity PY has been 
used for Previous Year throughout and we have identi-
fied significance in tables by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and 
*** p < 0.01.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive results – question 1
For the total sample the profile over the eight years is 
illustrated in Figure 1. It clearly shows the effect of the 
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Figure 1. Key measures for all companies (n = 170)
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turnover also dropped in 2008 it recovered the following 
year. The net assets, FTE’s and owned and leased CRE 
remained relatively steady through the period. However, 
substantial increases were seen with the surplus property 
provision (SPP) and the total provision, not only in 2008 
but continuing through the period.
The analysis of the difference in means between SPP 
and non-SPP groups are shown in Table 1 and of the per-
centage changes in Table 2. A number of metrics show 
a significant difference between the SPP and non-SPP 
groups, but fewer than anticipated. That appears to be 
the result of large standard deviations for many of the 
means. A number of metrics have relatively low p-values, 
but do not reach the (low) significance level of p < 0.1. 
We will now discuss the results of the analysis. Firstly, 
we consider the significant differences between SPP and 
non-SPP means in 2014 followed by the change from 
2007 to 2014.
Table 1. Mean values per company per category in 2014 (n = 170)
Measure
2014 mean T-Test non SPP to SPP 2014 2007 to 2014 change
SPP Non-SPP t-value p-value SPP Non-SPP
All companies 99 companies 71 companies
Turnover (£’m) 5 949 4 568 −0.833 0.406 31% 63%
PBIT (£’m) 483 512 0.141 0.888 −16% 49%
Profit margin (%) 13% 16% 1.160 0.248 −4% −7%
Net assets (£’m) 5 246 2 154 −1.631 0.106 40% 54%
FTE’s 33 124 26 632 −0.553 0.581 11% 16%
SPP (£’m) 37 0 N/A N/A 151% N/A
Freehold (£’m) 577 233 −1.399 0.165 29% 24%
Lease total (£’m) 868 267 −2.598 0.010** 13% 44%
Total CRE (£’m) 1 445 500 −2.088 0.039** 19% 34%
Lease % total CRE (%) 71% 56% −3.224 0.002*** −3% 3%
Lease total as % years profit (%) 51% 1208% 1.194 0.234 −90% 1850%
Owned CRE per FTE (£) 10 310 12 310 0.987 0.325 25% 35%
Lease total per FTE (£) 44 539 27 382 −1.279 0.203 2% 78%
Total CRE per FTE (£) 54 849 39 692 −1.106 0.270 5% 62%
Finance 24 companies 15 companies
Turnover (£’m) 9 192 9 106 −0.016 0.987 23% 91%
PBIT (£’m) 1 130 664 −0.665 0.510 −28% 35%
Profit margin (%) 22% 20% −0.378 0.708 −13% −27%
Net assets (£’m) 14 671 4 581 −1.466 0.154 53% 60%
FTE’s 30 915 11 365 −1.407 0.169 −11% 1%
SPP (£’m) 44 0 N/A N/A 218% N/A
Freehold (£’m) 373 114 −1.510 0.141 −4% −35%
Lease total (£’m) 552 241 −1.106 0.276 −10% 29%
Total CRE (£’m) 925 355 −1.463 0.154 −8% −2%
Lease % total CRE (%) 81% 76% −0.637 0.528 2% −4%
Lease total as % years profit (%) 116% 31% −2.323 0.029** 130% 21%
Owned CRE per FTE (£) 6 470 7 880 0.528 0.600 1% −6%
Lease total per FTE (£) 40 874 41 387 0.036 0.971 −7% 96%
Total CRE per FTE (£) 47 343 49 267 0.128 0.899 −6% 67%
Professional services 20 companies 9 companies
Turnover (£’m) 3 015 2 137 −0.662 0.513 54% 59%
PBIT (£’m) 150 217 0.429 0.671 6% 77%
Profit margin (%) 8% 14% 1.300 0.205 −15% 18%
Net assets (£’m) 550 732 0.838 0.410 28% 90%
FTE’s 45 888 90 819 0.768 0.449 32% 31%
SPP (£’m) 14 0 N/A N/A 41% N/A
Freehold (£’m) 60 40 −0.704 0.488 13% 30%
Lease total (£’m) 295 131 −0.76 0.454 48% 36%
Total CRE (£’m) 355 172 −0.863 0.396 41% 35%
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Measure
2014 mean T-Test non SPP to SPP 2014 2007 to 2014 change
SPP Non-SPP t-value p-value SPP Non-SPP
Lease % total CRE (%) 74% 74% 0.014 0.989 0% 12%
Lease total as % years profit (%) 244% 72% −0.831 0.413 18% 17%
Owned CRE per FTE (£) 5 934 3 042 −0.786 0.439 43% −13%
Lease total per FTE (£) 29 676 6 724 −0.909 0.371 18% 9%
Total CRE per FTE (£) 35 610 9 766 −1.019 0.317 22% 1%
TMT 17 companies 8 companies
Turnover (£’m) 5 757 833 −2.083 0.053* 21% 142%
PBIT (£’m) 305 152 −0.313 0.757 7% 140%
Profit margin (%) 17% 18% 0.212 0.834 26% 24%
Net assets (£’m) 5 549 594 −0.805 0.429 6% 103%
FTE’s 25 799 3 665 −2.411 0.028** 13% 30%
SPP (£’m) 73 0 N/A N/A 167% N/A
Freehold (£’m) 130 27 −1.282 0.213 4% 52%
Lease total (£’m) 965 100 −1.743 0.100 −2% 146%
Total CRE (£’m) 1 094 127 −1.807 0.089* −1% 117%
Lease % total CRE (%) 80% 74% −0.553 0.585 −5% 2%
Lease total as % years profit (%) −216% 10124% 1.043 0.332 −115% 39006%
Owned CRE per FTE (£) 6 148 9 366 0.869 0.394 58% 121%
Lease total per FTE (£) 67 111 92 796 0.309 0.760 17% 135%
Total CRE per FTE (£) 73 259 102 162 0.343 0.735 20% 134%
Manufacturing 19 companies 35 companies
Turnover (£’m) 2 723 4 276 1.059 0.295 55% 45%
PBIT (£’m) 290 636 1.334 0.188 31% 57%
Profit margin (%) 14% 14% 1.050 0.299 19% −3%
Net assets (£’m) 1 105 1 982 0.963 0.340 61% 43%
FTE’s 12 433 22 207 1.364 0.179 11% 7%
SPP (£’m) 9 0 N/A N/A 121% N/A
Freehold (£’m) 209 332 1.076 0.287 34% 48%
Lease total (£’m) 107 232 1.113 0.272 22% 47%
Total CRE (£’m) 317 564 1.230 0.225 29% 47%
Lease % total CRE (%) 39% 37% −0.397 0.693 −18% 5%
Lease total as % years profit (%) 76% 64% −0.407 0.686 −28% 12%
Owned CRE per FTE (£) 15 881 17 119 0.361 0.720 29% 49%
Lease total per FTE (£) 20 942 9 144 −0.928 0.365 10% 36%
Total CRE per FTE (£) 36 823 26 263 −0.969 0.337 17% 44%
Retail 19 companies 4 companies
Turnover (£’m) 8 336 3 049 −0.697 0.493 37% 27%
PBIT (£’m) 368 239 −0.399 0.694 2% −19%
Profit margin (%) 7% 12% 1.662 0.111 2% −12%
Net assets (£’m) 2 155 873 −0.684 0.502 32% 78%
FTE’s 49 720 24 120 −0.550 0.588 13% 15%
SPP (£’m) 48 0 N/A N/A 138% N/A
Freehold (£’m) 2 146 661 −0.565 0.578 41% 8%
Lease total (£’m) 2 546 1 304 −0.605 0.552 24% 42%
Total CRE (£’m) 4 692 1 965 −0.600 0.555 31% 28%
Lease % total CRE (%) 77% 72% −0.367 0.718 −1% 1%
Lease total as % years profit (%) −21% 350% 0.186 0.854 −102% 13%
Owned CRE per FTE (£) 17 922 13 596 −0.363 0.720 23% 0%
Lease total per FTE (£) 68 216 50 094 −0.598 0.556 −10% 17%
Total CRE per FTE (£) 86 138 63 689 −0.728 0.474 −5% 13%
Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01
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Table 2. Mean values and t-test of change for variables 2007 to 2014 (n = 170)
Change 2007 to 2014 SPP Non-SPP t-value p-value
All companies 99 companies 71 companies
Turnover 65.9% 98.1% 2.345 0.02**
Profit 180.3% 132.1% −0.350 0.727
Profit margin 28.7% 29.2% 0.012 0.991
Net assets 5.5% 142.3% 1.679 0.095*
FTE’s 41.7% 55.4% 0.948 0.344
Freehold 143.2% 394.6% 1.099 0.274
Lease total 83.4% 692.0% 1.635 0.107
Total CRE 83.4% 609.4% 1.458 0.149
Leases as % total CRE −2.2% 64.3% 2.005 0.049**
Lease total as % years profit −77.1% −619.4% −0.542 0.589
Owned CRE per FTE 105.9% 134.8% 0.305 0.761
Lease total per FTE 43.3% 284.3% 1.816 0.073*
Total CRE per FTE 42.9% 209.6% 1.328 0.188
Finance 24 companies 15 companies
Turnover 75.0% 104.6% 0.997 0.325
Profit 96.8% 75.2% −0.299 0.767
Profit margin −7.2% −12.3% −0.254 0.801
Net assets 109.0% 100.8% −0.139 0.890
FTE’s 77.8% 89.4% 0.228 0.821
Freehold 13.8% 249.4% 1.573 0.165
Lease total 215.5% 850.6% 1.551 0.140
Total CRE 218.4% 862.4% 1.466 0.161
Leases as % total CRE −4.1% 117.4% 0.964 0.352
Lease total as % years profit 128.4% 948.5% 1.525 0.151
Owned CRE per FTE 7.3% 113.7% 1.292 0.236
Lease total per FTE 143.3% 300.3% 0.957 0.345
Total CRE per FTE 147.3% 285.3% 0.815 0.420
Professional services 20 companies 9 companies
Turnover 64.7% 67.4% 0.111 0.912
Profit 29.4% 63.8% 0.348 0.731
Profit margin −25.9% 62.2% 1.067 0.295
Net assets −145.0% 136.3% 0.606 0.550
FTE’s 35,0% 47.8% 0.549 0.587
Freehold 64.6% 38.3% −0.326 0.747
Lease total 51.9% 95.3% 0.966 0.343
Total CRE 50.2% 60.2% 0.283 0.779
Leases as % total CRE −0.3% 17.7% 1.816 0.080*
Lease total as % years profit 9.0% 48.4% 1.05 0.303
Owned CRE per FTE 30.4% −10.7% −1.081 0.290
Lease total per FTE 32.9% 28.9% −0.104 0.918
Total CRE per FTE 26.5% 5.8% −1.115 0.275
TMT 17 companies 8 companies
Turnover 45.7% 225.2% 3.588 0.002***
Profit 720.2% 240.2% −0.498 0.623
Profit margin 206.4% 5.6% −0.757 0.457
Net assets −18.5% 300.8% 3.539 0.002***
FTE’s 22.5% 154.7% 3.202 0.012**
Freehold 266.9% 2376.8% 1.128 0.296
Lease total 28.3% 3374.6% 1.062 0.324
Total CRE 29.3% 3360.0% 1.083 0.314
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Change 2007 to 2014 SPP Non-SPP t-value p-value
Leases as % total CRE 0.3% 21.7% 0.879 0.404
Lease total as % years profit −361.7% −7614.0% 0.404 0.436
Owned CRE per FTE 327.1% 719.6% 0.658 0.519
Lease total per FTE −1.1% 1136.2% 1.046 0.330
Total CRE per FTE −0.7% 1100.6% 1.036 0.335
Manufacturing 19 companies 35 companies
Turnover 87.3% 75.5% −0.528 0.599
Profit 95.0% 156.1% 0.650 0.518
Profit margin −4.0% 48.3% 1.088 0.282
Net assets −14.0% 126.8% 1.504 0.139
FTE’s 33.8% 22.5% −0.795 0.430
Freehold 88.8% 73.8% −0.476 0.636
Lease total 24.5% 242.3% 2.271 0.029**
Total CRE 48.0% 77.7% 1.160 0.251
Leases as % total CRE −11.1% 72.0% 1.393 0.169
Lease total as % years profit −13.7% 109.0% 2.082 0.044**
Owned CRE per FTE 43.8% 47.2% 0.205 0.839
Lease total per FTE 1.6% 180.5% 2.499 0.017**
Total CRE per FTE 12.4% 49.1% 3.072 0.003***
Retail 19 companies 4 companies
Turnover 52.3% 85.3% 0.888 0.384
Profit 46.5% 72.0% 0.384 0.705
Profit margin 5.0% −10.4% −0.343 0.735
Net assets 74.0% 130.7% 0.447 0.660
FTE’s 28.1% 35.2% 0.243 0.810
Freehold 306.8% 32.6% −0.428 0.673
Lease total 64.7% 48.6% −0.161 0.873
Total CRE 39.0% 47.3% 0.148 0.884
Leases as % total CRE 4.9% 0.8% −0.327 0.747
Lease total as % years profit −225.3% 7.2% 0.827 0.418
Owned CRE per FTE 184.7% 5.6% −0.434 0.669
Lease total per FTE 14.6% 8.2% −0.189 0.852
Total CRE per FTE 3.5% 7.0% 0.187 0.854
Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01
All Companies: No financial metric in 2014 indicated a 
significant difference between the two groups, although the 
net assets metric was close (p = 0.106) to significant, indi-
cating that SPP companies might have a larger asset base 
than non-SPP ones. Significant differences in CRE metrics 
between SPP and non-SPP companies in 2014 were identi-
fied for the metrics of lease total; total CRE and leases as a 
percentage of total CRE. In all cases the mean is larger for 
the SPP than the non-SPP group. Thus, SPP companies have 
a larger CRE portfolio with a greater emphasis on leasing 
than non-SPP companies. Looking at change over the eight 
years the non-SPP companies grew their turnover and net 
assets together with increased leases as a percentage of total 
CRE and the cost of leases per FTE more than SPP ones. 
The lease total (p = 0.107) supports the view that non-SPP 
companies are expanding their business and with it their 
leased CRE at a greater rate than SPP ones. The increase in 
the SPP itself rose from £15m to £37m, a 151% increase.
Finance: Financial measures showed no difference be-
tween SPP and non-SPP companies. The lease total as a 
percentage of profit was significantly higher for SPP com-
panies, indicating a longer commitment to leases relative to 
profit generation. No difference was found on the change 
measure for financial metrics or CRE measures. The SPP 
rose by 218% from 2007 to £44m in 2014, the largest rise of 
all categories, but was not the largest absolute sum.
Professional Services: The analysis did not generate 
any significant differences between the SPP and non-SPP 
means for 2014. The change in leases as a percentage of 
total CRE was significant indicating that non-SPP com-
panies have increased the proportion of total CRE they 
lease more than SPP companies. The amount of surplus 
leasehold space grew by 41% to £14m.
TMT: Turnover and FTE’s are larger for SPP compa-
nies and, no doubt to facilitate those additional people, the 
total CRE is larger, primarily through leasing (lease total 
End of Table 2
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p = 0.100). Turnover, net assets, and FTE’s all increased 
more for non-SPP companies over the period, although 
that is not reflected in the CRE change metrics. The cat-
egory grew its SPP by 167% to £73m, the highest absolute 
SPP sum across all categories.
Manufacturing: This is the only category where the 
number of non-SPP companies (35) exceeds the SPP ones 
(19). There are no differences between SPP and non-SPP 
companies for financial or CRE measures in 2014. Over 
the eight years the change for non-SPP companies of CRE 
metrics of lease total; lease total as a percentage of profits; 
lease total per FTE and total CRE per FTE increased more 
than SPP companies. This indicates that non-SPP compa-
nies are increasing their leases at a greater rate in absolute 
terms and relative terms, but the change is not matched 
by a significant change in business metrics. That would 
suggest that expansion in leases is speculative, rather than 
reacting to actual growth. The SPP total grew by 121% to 
£9m, the smallest absolute sum of all categories. The larger 
proportion of non-SPP companies in this category (65% 
against 42% for All Companies) may reflect the high CRE 
capital investment (buildings, their adaptation and the 
production plant contained in them), which could mean 
that only a significant long-term decline would trigger 
lease closures.
Retail: This has the smallest non-SPP sector (4 compa-
nies) which as mentioned earlier is regarded as very small 
(N < 5) (de Winter, 2013), and would raise the question of 
validity on the test outcomes, but the t-test did not iden-
tify any differences. SPP jumped in 2009, 2013 and 2014, 
reflecting a decline in profits and suggesting an inverse re-
lationship with profit levels, the total in 2014 being £48m 
(+138%).
Taking a broad view and recognising that the t-test 
does not identify all the differences as significant, the 
data and analysis indicates that there are differences in 
the profiles for those that make an SPP and those that do 
not (Q1). SPP companies are generally larger, based on 
turnover, net assets and FTE’s, but generate lower profits 
from a larger CRE portfolio. Over the eight years non-SPP 
companies have grown their business and expanded their 
CRE at a greater rate, in particular their leased space. The 
profile of a smaller CRE portfolio could suggest that the 
non-SPP group are more agile and flexible with dynamic 
alignment capability and able to react more quickly to 
business change, thereby exploiting transient competitive 
advantage opportunities (McGrath, 2013) or blue oceans 
(Kim & Maugborgne, 2015). This could reflect a smaller 
organisation, certainly in terms of FTE’s, which may mean 
they have flatter management structures. If so, they are 
more likely to benefit from iterative learning loops (Mint-
zberg et al., 2009) and the key decision-makers may have 
greater visibility of CRE issues (Greenhalgh, 2008; Nun-
nington & Haynes, 2011).
The CRE analysis appears to be counter to the gener-
ally accepted view that space consumption has declined 
with new ways of working as the increased cost commit-
ment indicates space is not being reduced. There is an ar-
gument that the cost increase could reflect rent reviews, 
but the period 2007 to 2014 saw significant falls in rental 
values because of the impact of the recession. An alterna-
tive explanation might be that businesses have built ex-
pansion space into their portfolios. However, that is un-
likely for a few reasons. During the period business profits 
were under pressure (Figure 1) and there was considerable 
uncertainty in the world. Taking space and immediately 
designating it as surplus would hit profits even harder and 
would be unpalatable to investors. Secondly it would be 
something that auditors would not approve of because it 
breaches IAS37 requirements. Table  1 indicates that the 
SPP companies have a significantly higher commitment 
for CRE for various measures, including the commitment 
per FTE and the lease commitment expressed as a propor-
tion of profit.
One potential explanation of the increase in freehold 
ownership is that the recession resulted in a number of 
forced sellers of commercial property and occupiers could 
have exploited the depressed market by acquiring free-
holds at relatively low prices.
4.2. Auto-regression model results questions 2, 3 
and 4
The regression model of the best fit business metrics (Q2) 
was run following the multicollinearity checks and the 
output is in Table 3. Those business metrics that were ex-
cluded due to multicollinearity are indicated in the table. 
The previous year metrics for turnover, profit and FTE 
were excluded across all categories and therefore have not 
been included in the table.
The regression models for business metrics show a 
good fit of data for most of the categories, with an R2 Ad-
justed over 0.750 (bar Manufacturing – 0.458).
Following the multicollinearity exercise the predomi-
nant significant metric was turnover, which showed a re-
lationship with SPP for All Companies, TMT and Retail. 
Manufacturing had a significant positive relationship be-
tween FTE and SPP. Profit exhibited a significant negative 
relationship with SPP for All Companies and TMT, whilst 
the negative relationship for Finance was very close to the 
significance threshold of p < 0.1 (0.104). Profit margins 
had a negative relationship for Retail and positive for 
TMT. Professional Services did not exhibit any significant 
relationships for SPP with business metrics. The regres-
sion models anticipated a negative relationship between 
the SPP and all the business metrics as per Q2, however, 
only the relationship between SPP and profit was as antici-
pated. Both turnover and FTE had positive relationships, 
the converse of what had been hypothesised, whilst profit 
margins provide contradictory results.
The hypothesised inverse relationship between prof-
its and SPP is supported: as profits decline operational 
space is closed and the provision for surplus property is 
increased. The expectation that a decline in revenue and/
or profit margin and/or FTE will see the SPP increase is 
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not supported. SPP is increasing when the business is ex-
panding (as measured by turnover and FTE numbers), 
which indicates that CRE dynamic alignment capability is 
lacking. Businesses are not able to change the CRE profile 
without making an SPP.
The coefficients of the auto-regression term, the previ-
ous year SPP, are positive as expected (Table 3). The coef-
ficient indicates the rate of decline of the surplus portfolio 
(Q3). The calculation 1/(1-coefficient) gives an estimate of 
how many years it takes before SPP tends towards zero. 
Three possible outcomes are projected: short term decline 
(<5 years), long-term reduction (>5 years) or continued 
increase in the SPP. The short-term decline group includes 
TMT (2.5 years) and Manufacturing (3.8 years), the long-
term group comprises Retail (7.0 years) and Professional 
Services (8.6 years). Those indicating a continued growth 
in SPP consists of Finance (increasing by 14.2% per an-
num) and All Companies (growing at 0.6% per annum, 
albeit virtually a static position). Only TMT has the re-
lationship between longevity SPP and CRE as proposed 
under Q3.
The expectation that SPP will be short term (<5 years) 
because the CRE has dynamic alignment capability was 
only identified for TMT and Manufacturing. For Retail and 
Professional Services, the slow rate of decline (>7 years) 
indicates a limited CRE dynamic alignment capability. The 
Finance sector with its continued SPP expansion suggests 
a commitment to long term leases and a continuation of 
operational property closure. CRE portfolios do not ap-
pear in practice as agile as some expect them to be (Joroff 
& Becker, 2017).
The same regression analysis process for business 
metrics was adopted for the lease metrics (Q4) (Table 4), 
including multicollinearity checks. Those lease metrics ex-
cluded due to multicollinearity are indicated in the table.
The data fit (R2 Adjusted) is reasonably good (>0.700) 
except for Manufacturing (0.436). Significant positive re-
lationships were identified between SPP and leases <1 year 
are All Companies and Retail, whilst for leases 2−5 years it 
is Finance. TMT had a positive relationship between SPP 
and the previous year leases <1 year but a negative one 
with the previous year leases >5 years. A positive previous 
year is akin to a negative relationship in the current year, 
whilst a positive one indicates negative for the current 
year. Therefore, TMT indicates a negative relationship for 
leases <1 year and a positive one for leases >5 years. Pro-
fessional Services and Manufacturing did not exhibit any 
significant relationships between SPP and lease metrics. 
It had been anticipated that the relationship between SPP 
and leases <5 years would be negative (Q4); however, both 
are positive as short-term leases increase SPP increases.
The analysis of lease variables shows no evidence of 
there being an adjustment to a more flexible portfolio uti-
lising the core and periphery approach (Gibson & Lizieri, 
1999). The general increase in the first periphery band 
could reflect a move to increasing the amount of short-
term space to provide more flexibility. The expectation 
would be a reduction in leases >5 years, but the evidence 
of a negative relationship between SPP and leases >5 years 
does not exist, rather for TMT it is positive relationship. 
The data (Table 1) and results (Table 4) suggest that busi-
ness is expanding its CRE, especially of leases <5years.
In summary, the broad pattern between SPP and both 
financial and CRE parameters is that SPP increases as 
profits decline (All Companies, Finance and TMT) and 
when turnover and/or FTE increases (All Companies, 
TMT, Manufacturing and Retail). This is reflected in the 
mean data values showing turnover at +31%, FTE’s at +7% 
and profits −5%. This would indicate a more complex set 
of relationships than envisaged.
The increase of SPP when profit declines, matches the 
original expectation reflecting closure of CRE when the 
business is under pressure. This decline in profits is not 
caused by the creation of the SPP itself, as explained in 
the methodology, an adjusted profit was used to remove 
the effect of any SPP increase. The increase of SPP when 
turnover and/or FTE’s increase suggests a different ration-
ale for closing space. If business is expanding production 
and/or increasing employment levels it may seek supple-
mental space and/or better space to deal with the capacity. 
Space that is replaced and added to the SPP indicates that 
portfolio’s lack dynamic alignment capability. Supplemen-
tal space may be indicated by the increase in short-term 
leases for some business. What the analysis has shown is a 
lack of CRE dynamic alignment, which raises the question 
as to whether CRE agility has improved significantly over 
the last two decades (Joroff & Becker, 2017).
The study identified that only in TMT did SPP revert 
to zero within three years. It also identified that 42% of the 
total survey sample (71 of 170 companies) did not make 
an SPP. Assuming the 71 companies do not have any sur-
plus space, just 10% of the total sample indicate a possible 
dynamic alignment capability to facilitate CRE agility.
Business does not appear to be re-cycling surplus 
space. The expectation was that when additional space 
was needed the business would reduce surplus property 
first before taking new units. That does not appear to be 
the case, the commitment to CRE is increasing at a greater 
rate than the SPP is being removed. The additional CRE 
costs and the continuation of SPP will put pressure on 
future profit margins. As such it does raise the question as 
to how business is measuring the performance of its CRE 
and whether it is looking for added value from it.
5. Limitations and recommendations
A key benefit of using the data from the financial accounts 
of companies is the requirement that they report informa-
tion in a set format, which provides consistency of data 
across companies. However, because the data provided in 
the company accounts is in this set format, it was not fea-
sible for this research to provide supplementary data. For 
example, additional data on the number of units and total 
square metres would have been very beneficial. It would 
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enable a more extensive analysis of the CRE portfolio 
and link the spatial and financial elements. The lack of 
knowledge on the 71 non-SPP companies is a limitation of 
this study. The solution could be to approach those com-
panies to seek to ascertain the status of surplus property 
throughout the eight years. However, getting cooperation 
and identifying personnel with appropriate knowledge 
across the period is likely to be difficult. The SPP forms 
part of the total provision and whilst the research could 
have considered the change in the total provision without 
directly approaching companies it would not be possible 
to draw any conclusions about the SPP from any increase 
in the total provision. The only option would be a study 
of the 71 companies individually. An alternative approach 
to compensate for the 71 companies could be an exten-
sion of the sample group. This could match the business 
sector profile of the 170 companies or it could resolve an-
other limitation of the study by extending beyond quoted 
UK companies. The addition of unquoted UK companies 
might offset the disproportionate representation of finan-
cial services in the FTSE350, whilst including companies 
from other countries could provide a comparison of the 
impact of the UK lease term on dynamic alignment capa-
bility between countries.
It is possible that the relatively consistent growth in 
turnover over the eight-year period may have been a fac-
tor in the positive SPP relationship identified, rather than 
the projected inverse one. A more in-depth search on spe-
cific companies that have undergone volatility in turnover 
might prove enlightening, although the strength of the re-
lationship between SPP and turnover would suggest any 
change in the results unlikely.
Short term occupational agreements that comprise the 
second periphery group are not identified in company ac-
counts and therefore analysis of them has not been pos-
sible. It would be beneficial to research the extent to which 
business utilised pay as you go agreements and whether 
they were the first tranche of space closed when profits 
declined. Indeed, extending the research to look at the 
proportion of the total portfolio that pay as you go space 
comprises would extend the knowledge on CRE portfolio 
structuring and the capability for agility.
A feature of the UK economy over the last decade has 
been poor productivity (Guardian, 2016). Despite profits 
being depressed over the period (−5%) there was a 7% 
increase in FTE numbers A further line of research is 
whether companies sought to avoid headcount reduction 
to ensure they had the right people for when the economic 
climate improved, but this does not explain the 19% in-
crease in CRE. An understanding of this dynamic might 
shed light on changes to the SPP and the relationship with 
CRE metrics, as this is another indication that is contrary 
to the notion that there is an ongoing reduction in space 
consumption. An additional consideration on the use of 
space use is not only the square metres of consumed but 
an examination of the CRE cost commitment (the total 
cost of CRE over the life of the lease) and how that relates 
to FTE’s. This would provide both the absolute and rela-
tive costs of space. Research that considers the rationale of 
CRE change at a company level with case studies should 
provide additional knowledge on CRE decision-making 
and whether direct evidence can be found linking the size 
of company, the length of business strategy time horizon 
and the flexibility through the length of lease commit-
ments.
What the research does illustrate is that surplus prop-
erty is not a transitory effect of re-alignment. The analysis 
identifies that 90% of companies with an SPP still have the 
liability three years later, all things being equal. The rea-
lignment of CRE is not a seamless process as there appears 
to be obstacles in the way. Therefore, alignment models 
such as Lindholm et al. (2006) need to be adjusted to in-
clude the process of realignment itself and its consequen-
tial effects. Joroff and Becker (2017) suggested that CRE 
has become an agile asset over the last 25 years, indeed 
“agility has become an overarching objective” (Joroff & 
Becker, 2017, p. 33). This research suggests that in prac-
tice CRE has not become agile. Whilst agility may be 
sought so far it does not appear to have been universally 
implemented. Consequently, there is a disconnect between 
what is being said about CRE agility and what the finan-
cial analysis shows. The suggestion that decision-making 
has become more holistic might apply in certain elements 
of the workplace, but not for the consequential effects of 
change for the portfolio.
There are hidden costs associated with surplus prop-
erty management relating to risk, financial reporting 
compliance, etc. that impact on business performance. 
Decision-making techniques need to incorporate the 
consequences of creating surplus property to ensure they 
function adequately (Neely & Bourne, 2000). The research 
indicates that decision making structures, such as the BSC 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996), and iterative learning processes 
(e.g. Mintzberg et al., 2009; Kay, 2010) need to include all 
CRE and surplus property aspects as part of the overall 
assessment.
What the research confirms is that CRE dynamic align-
ment capability has not been fully adopted by occupiers 
and the manner in which CRE change takes place and its 
inter-relationship with the SPP does not follow anticipated 
patterns. That would suggest that a line of research would 
be to investigate individual company decision-making 
processes. This would look to identify the factors consid-
ered by the decision-makers in dealing with CRE in times 
of change and adoption of a dynamic alignment capability.
This research provides a number of elements for 
practitioners to consider. Firstly, the need to review their 
CRE portfolio and ascertain its dynamic alignment capa-
bility. Allied to that is an understanding of the relative 
importance of individual units to the business allowing 
the CRE Manager to differentiate between core and pe-
riphery space. From that point there should be a CREAM 
strategy to build flexibility into the portfolio, for exam-
ple, by means of break clauses or short-term leases to 
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create CRE dynamic alignment capability that links with 
the status of each property. Together with an examina-
tion of CRE costs per FTE and to determine whether 
they are declining or are actually rising as new ways of 
working are implemented. The broader approach for the 
business involves developing management and decision-
making systems that reflect the iterative, emergent nature 
of business strategy and acting to avoid the creation of a 
surplus property portfolio.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to understand how surplus lease-
hold property has changed and with it the inter-relation-
ship with financial and CRE parameters over an eight-year 
period. It identified mixed evidence of dynamic alignment 
of CRE. CRE dynamic alignment capability appears to re-
main a theoretical concept for many organisations as this 
research indicates a lack of evidence of it in the financial 
reporting of CRE. Businesses appear to have used the SPP 
as a means of enabling them to react to business change 
because the portfolio lacks flexibility that short term leases 
and break clauses provide. This lack of dynamic alignment 
capability will hamper a company in responding to change 
arising from business or economic downturn or from op-
portunities. As such a lack of CRE agility will impair the 
ability of a business to exploit opportunities and respond 
to the effects of transient competitive advantage (McGrath, 
2013) and/or blue ocean strategy (Kim & Maugborgne, 
2015) opportunities.
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